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Introduction

T

he last thirty years have seen a resurgence of interest in virtue in

Anglo-American philosophy. Virtue ethics, an approach to normative theory that focuses on the character of the agent , has established itself as a legitimate alternative to consequentialism and deontology.'
Work elucidating theories of virtue within these competing traditions has
also moved forward.' Despite the rising interest in virtue, h owever, little
attention has been paid to the question of how virtue is developed' This
volume aims to address that gap in the literature. It is a collection of mostly
new essays solicited from philosophers, psychologist s, and theologian s, ali
in the forefront o f research on virtue. 4 Each of their contributions focuses
on some aspect of virtue development, either by highlighting virtue cultivation within distinctive traditions of psychological, ethical, or religious
thought, by taking a developmental perspective to yield fresh insights into
criticisms of virtue ethics, or by examining the science that explains virtue
development . Russell and Driver inves tigate virtue cultivation or problems
associated with it from Aristotelian and utilitarian perspectives, the latter
focusing on sentimentalist virtue development, a theme taken up by Slote.
Cureton and Hill and Swanton explore self-improvement , the former from
a Kantian vantage point) the latter with an eye toward offering solutions to
the problems of self-centeredness and virtue ethical right action. Slingerland examines contemporary psychology as well as virtue development in
the Confucian tradition to counter situationist criticisms of virtue ethics.

Flanagan, Bucar, and Herdt examine virtue cultivation in the Buddhist,
Islamic, and Christian traditions, respectively. The essays by Narvaez, Thompson, and McAdams offer descriptive insights fro m psychology into virtue
development. The result is a collection of extremely creative essays that not
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only fills the current gap but also promises to stimulate new work on a relatively neglected yet vital topic.
Stimulating new work on virtue cultivation and related topics is a second
aim of the volume. The deeper idea he re is to shape the traj ectory of research
on virtue in new and fruitful ways. Focusing the attention of the best minds
in the field on virtue development is a way of rounding out current research
on virtue and offering new directions forward. As research on virtue cultivation progresses, the hope is that investigations of related areas will advance
as well. For example, in saying something about virtue cultivation , we must
also think about the development of personality, rationality, motivation,
and emotions, and consider the roles of parents and supportive communities in virtue education. We must think about habituation and bodily practices. We must seek to integrate science into our thinking, investigate nonWestern conceptions of virtue, and compare and contrast them with more
familiar Western accounts . Finally, we sh ould begin to acknowledge that theological perspectives on virtue can add value to philosophical discussions. In
short, this volume aims to suggest to readers further research opportunities in multiple directions .
The volume is arranged in the following order. Russell begins with an
Aristot elian perspective on virtue development, followed by Driver on utilitarianism, Slate on sentimentalism, Cureton and Hill on Kantianism. and
Swanton on self-improvement. Slingerland and Flanagan leave the Western
tradition to take readers into the nuances of Confucianism and Buddhism,
respectively. Religious ethicists Bucar and Herdt follow with explorations
of Islamic and Christian virtue cultivatio n. Finally, psychologists Narvaez,
Thompson, and McAdam s are given th e last word, discussing virtue development from three diffe rent psychological perspectives.
Despite their differences, several common themes emerge in these presenta tions. The importance of early upbringing for the development of
virtue is highlighted by Russell, Slote, a nd Flanagan, and reinforced in the
essays by psychologists . Driver, Slote, Thompson, and Narvaez stress the
importance of affect for the growth of virtue. Driver mines early sentimentalist thinkers for insights into virtue development, and Slote continues
that t radition with a contemporary account . Slingerland and Swanton use
developmental approaches to virtue to counter criticisms of virtue ethics. In
the traditions explored by Bucar and Slingerland, bodily practices contribute
to virtue development. Metaphysical assumptions form the background for
virtue cultivation in the Buddhist and Kantian thought examined by Flanagan and Cureton and Hill. The importance of m otivation is underscored by
Russell, Swanton, and McAdams. McAdams explicitly relates his psychological view of virtue development to Aristotle's perspective. Bucar and Herdt
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accentuate God's role in the acquisition of virtue. Finally, t he importance of
community is integral to the views of virtue cultivation offered by Herdt,
Narvaez, and McAdams. Let us turn to an examination of each author's
{o'ntribution.

In "Aristotle on Cultivating Virtue," Daniel C. Russell sketches an Aristotelian research program for virtue development. He articulates what Aristotle
thinks virtue is and how it is acquired. Russell here seeks to show that ·
Aristotle thinks virtue, its acquisition , and the competencies needed for it
are mundane-that is, parts of our daily lives and of the ordinary ways in
which we t ry to better ourselves. To develop virtue we must develop dispositions to choose and act for virtue-relevant goals. Virtue is dynamic;
though virtue acquisition takes place as a person develops, it is an ongoing
process, occurring even among mature agents. Russell's central contention

is that light can be shed on our understanding of virtue acquisition by studying how skills are acquired. Thus, the n otions of skill and of skill acquisition
are at the heart of an Aristotelian perspective on cultivating virtue.

Russell argues that this emphasis on skill meshes well with contemporary
psychology in two important respects. To understand the first respect, we
need to note the distinction between path-dependent and path-independent
ways of becoming moral . Path-independent approaches specify a moral
ideal and then chart ways of reaching it. Lawrence Kohlberg's model of universal moral thinking is • case in point. By contrast, path-dependent approaches survey how people generally improve themselves, then extend
this knowledge to an account of character development. As Russell notes,
the psychologists Darci. Narvaez and Daniel K. Lapsley call these contrasting approaches "moralized psychology" and "psychologized morality," respectively. Russell argues that Aristotle's is a path-dependent approach,
and hence, an example of psychologized morality.
A second respect in which Aristotle's view o f virtue acquisition meshes

well with contemporary psychology is in its emphasis on skill. Much work
in psych ology has been done on skill acquisition and expertise that is potentially useful for understanding character development. Since Aristotle
was not concerned with specifying in fine detail the competencies needed
for virtue, he can be viewed as setting out the broad contours of a research
program to be filled in by later generations. In this regard, the psychology
of skill acquisition is a promising area for ongoing research into virtue cul-

tivation. Yet, Russell cautions that such a program faces hurdles. Unlike
many contexts in which we acquire skills, virtue is messy. We cannot always
learn it in structured environments that afford us opportunities to learn

predictable regularities, nor do we always have the advantage of clear feedback. Despite these challenges, the psychology of skill acquisition remains
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a fertile reso~rce for further investigation into the nuances of Aristotelian
virtue cultivation.
Julia Driver's piece, "Mill, Moral Sentimentalism, and the Cultivation of
Virtue," examines utilitarian virtue cultivation through the work of John
Stuart Mill. Driver begins by making the point that many virtues, for Mill,
involve the perfection of our higher capacities for happiness or pleasure.
Improvement in the virtues, Mill thinks, can be aided by higher educational
institutions, but also by engaging with good literature. Through our reading
of literature, history, and documentaries, Driver argues, we develop our
abilities to put ourselves in the positions of others and take their perspectives. She develops this theme by examining the influence of moral sentimentalism on Mill's thought.
Though not all utilitarians are sentimentalists, Mill is influenced by sentimentalist concerns, such as the importance of natural sentiment-in
particular, sympathy-as the basis for the other-regarding conduct utilitarianism requires. In this respect, Driver contends, Mill is similar to
Hume. To be sure, Mill and Hume diverge in their accounts of virtue, yet a
broadly sentimentalist approach, Driver urges, helps us to interpret Mill's
cryptic remarks on the "art of life."
.
In A System o(Logic, Mill discusses the art of life in terms of three separate spheres: prudence, morality, and aesthetics. He associates aesthetics
with virtue and morality with right. Driver offers a way to conceptualize
the spheres by taking Mill to separate being virtuous from acting rightly
and wrongly. Her focus, however, is on how goodness in each sphere is to be
realized. Among the qualities needed to realize goodness in one's life, Driver
contends, is the ability to make good judgments about what it means to be
virtuous and/or do one's duty. That is, being dutiful as well as virtuous are
connected with the ability to make reliable judgments about duty and
virtue. Virtue and aesthetics are related through attention, as Iris Murdoch
urged, as well as through perspective-taking. Many philosophers endorse
the view that one's moral sensitivities are enlarged by the ability to take the
perspectives of others, Important information, such as the kinds of reasons that motivate others, is thereby attained. Perspective-taking is also a
way of correcting emotions and of allowing us to shed idiosyncratic concerns and enlarge our social sympathies. We cannot be a fully utilitarian
agent, Driver argues, unless we are virtuous-and that requires developing
the kinds of qualities and skills needed to take the "larger view" made possible by expanded social sympathies.
Sentimentalist virtue development is the theme of the next essay. Michael
Slote expands upon previous work to give a sentimentalist account of
moral development in "The Roots of Empathy." Noting that explanations of
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moral growth often begin with how children learn good behavior from loving
parents, Slate urges us take a step back and examine how early parent-child
interactions make these later educational processes possible or impossible.
His account, though consistent with the view that genetic or brain abnormalities playa role in psychopathy, focuses on the need for parental love, and
in particular, on the kinds of reactions to parental attitudes and behavior
that can inhibit or facilitate moral development. Children who are denied
parental love react with rage, which forecloses their capacities for basic associative or receptive empathy. This is the kind of empathy that allows us to
feel what others are going through, and is the sine qua non of further moral
development. By contrast, children who are loved by their parents respond
with gratitude. Gratitude, Slate argues, is the emotional basis for further
moral growth.
He begins by situating his account of gratitude within a sentimentalist
framework in which empathy has a central role to play in moral development. Just as empathy and sympathy have been found to contribute to altruistic behavior, so, too, Slate contends, gratitude can facilitate altruism.
Of special importance in moral development is a kind of diffuse or generalized gratitude that infants and children feel on having their need for parental love met. This generalized gratitude contrasts with the generalized
rage or anger that those denied parental love can come to feel. Slate clarifies his points about diffuse or generalized gratitude by examining cases of
adult gratitude. Not only are we grateful for benefits we are given, we are
also grateful for the sympathetic attitudes and motives with which those
boons are bestowed. In Slate's view, we "take in" those sympathetic attitudes and motives by a kind of associative or receptive empathy. Through
this receptivity, we become sympathetic too, and this aroused sympathy,
which Slate believes is gratitude, though focused mainly on our benefactor,
can be spread to others or generalized. We feel gratitude intensely because
it is aroused by benefits warmly bestowed on us, and this intensity of
feeling makes it less likely than other emotions to lose its force when it is
generalized.
Essentially the same processes that explain adult gratitude apply to
gratitude in early childhood. Young children have basic capacities for empathy, Slate contends, which allow them to take in the love and sympathy
they feel from their parents. This then generates gratitude-the diffusion
to others of the love and sympathy the child has taken in. The early gratitude is necessary for further moral development. Children who do not receive parental love, but instead, are neglected or abused, respond with anger
or rage-emotions which undercut their empathic capacities and preclude
the possibility of moral gTOwth. Slate concludes his piece by exploring some
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implications of his sentimentalist account of the early wellsprings of moral
development in empathy and gratitude for understandings of psychopathy
and, especially, of care ethics.
Adam Cureton and Thomas Hill examine a different approach to virtue
and moral education in their piece, "Kant on Virtue and the Virtues :" They
offer an overview o f Kant's conception o f virtue and discuss his views on
education and moral self-improvement. Kant's most thorough discussion
of v;rtue, they explain, is found in the Doctrine of Virtue, which is the
second part of The Metaphysics of Morals. To be fully virtuous, for Kant, is to
have a good will that is firmly resolved and fully ready to overcome temptations, both internal and external, to immorality. The aim of the virtuous is
not only to avoid acting wrongly and to pursue moral ends, but also to do
so for the right reason s. The good will is that faculty that enables imperfect
humans to act for the right reasons-that is, to act from respect for the
Moral Law. Virtue is the strength of will always to do our duty and to act
from right reasons. Though we cannot attain it in this life, perfect virtue is,
nonetheless, an end to which we should aspire .
Kant's conception of virtue has several interesting features. First , unlike
some ancient virtue theorists, Kant maintains that we all have the capacity
to become virtuous. This is because being and becoming virtuous depend
so heavily on choice. We should strive to become virtuous and can become
virtuous despite impediments, such as innate personality traits and early
upbringing, which might not conduce to virtue. Second, like other virtue
theories, Kant's account has several roles for feelings. Third, Kant does not
hold that success is a condition of being v;rtuous; that is, the moral goodness or virtue of the agent does not depend upon the results she achieves.
Fourth, Kant takes an interesting position on the question of the unity of
the virtues. Virtue is the strength of will to fulfill our duties, whereas virtues are commitments to s pecific moral ends. If, from a sense of duty, I set
the happiness of others as a moral end and structure my choices around
that commitment, [ have the virtue of generosity. [t is a duty of virtue to be
generous in this sense. Kant maintains that there is only one virtue: the
second-order commitment to do one's duty for the sake of duty, but he
denies that particular virtues, s uch as generosity or courage, mutually
entail one another. The authors go on to discuss Kant's list of virtues and
vices, and explain how virtue fulfills our moral nature. Though v;rtue fulfills us morally and can help us to be cheerful and tranquil, Kant acknowledges that we can be v;rtuous but also destitute, despised, and unhappy.
Kant's views on moral education include discussions of the education of
children and adolescents, as well as the duty of m oral self-improvement
possessed by adults. The education of children is rule-governed: children
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are taught to conform their behavior to rules by being subjected to family
ruies, school rules, and the rules of games. These rules are meant to train
children to control their emotions, and to curb their "lawless freedom,"
while yet allowing them to develop naturally. The authors note that Kant's
account of these rules, as well as his views of the nature of punishment, are
similar to his ideas about the state and legal punishment. The education of
the adolescent is meant to enable her to make "good use" of freedom under
constraints-that is, to elicit her nascent sense of dignity-and to foster
her ability to represent to herself a sense of duty. Adolescents should be
given moral problems to ponder in order to develop and encourage rational
habits of moral approval and disapproval, among other desiderata. Upon
reaching adulthood, an individual's rational capacities should be sufficiently developed so that she is able to continue perfecting her moral
powers. The authors discuss the duty of moral self-improvement in terms
of Kant's scheme of perfect and imperfect duties, and conclude their piece
by considering objections and replies.
In "Cultivating Virtue: Two Problems for Virtue Ethics," Christine Swanton examines two problems internal to virtue ethics that apparently arise
from the commitment to be virtuous and to develop one's virtue. They are
the self-centeredness objection-that is , the claim that virtue ethics requires the agent to focus on her own virtue and flourishing, thereby undervaluing the regard due to others; and the charge that virtue ethical criteria
of right action, which rely on the notion that right action is what the virtuous person would characteristically do, cannot account for acts that
should be taken by imperfect agents seeking to improve their virtue.
Though arising in several answerable forms, the self-centeredness objection. Swanton contends. is especially problematic for virtue ethics when it
is making a particular claim about the deep structure of the virtuous agent's
motivation. The claim is that having virtue is the most practically important aspect of an agent's life, and that the virtuous agent must subordinate
everything else to this end. Swanton maintains that arguments against the
objection in the form in which it relies on this claim fail, then argues that
virtue ethics is not committed to the value structure at the heart of the
self-centeredness objection . She draws on her own view of virtue ethics as
pluralistic and non-eudaimonistic to make her case. What makes traits virtues, she contends, is not their contribution to the flourishing of their possessor, but their targets or aims. What motivates the agent who seeks to be
virtuous is the desire to attain the targets of virtue, and developing virtue
is secondary to that aim. This circumvents the self-centeredness objection,
and derails the notion that the desire to cultivate virtue must always be
self-centered or egoistic.

(8)

Introduction

Swanton al~so uses her account of virtue ethics to answer the charge that
virtue ethical theories of right action cannot explain the rightness of actions
taken by imperfect agents in efforts to cultivate their virtue. She proposes
an aspirational virtue of self-improvement, and offers a uthick" description
of it in terms of extent, motive, time, people, manner, and instruments
for its sustenance, such as good political structures. This account draws
on a variety of philosophical a nd psychological views to show how the
virtue is dynamic and satisfie s the conditions that Aristotle puts on
virtue, while not being overly burde n some or self-consuming for the
agent. Swanton also describes various perils into which unwary self-im provers might fall, such as susceptibility to feelings of self-righteousness
and sanctimoniousness.
Self-improvement is central to the Confucian tradition in ethics. Edward
Slingerland mines the insights of early Confucians to offer responses to the
situationist critique of virtue ethics in his chapter, "The Situationist Critique and Early Con fucian Virtue Ethics." A reworked version of the article
that originally appeared in Ethics, the piece offe rs empirical as weB as conceptual critiques of t he situationist challenge, t hen explores the views of
early Confucians, such as Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, on virtue education. Situation ism interprets classical virtue ethics as setting a "high bar"
for living virtuously, but the early Confucian tradition, through a combination of rigorous education and carefully chosen situational reinforcements.
offers ways for learners of virtue t o meet the challenge.
The situationist critique of virtue ethics is the argument, made most
prominently by Gilbert Harman and John Doris, that social psychological
studies show that global traits-traits that produce behavior that is consistent across different types of situations-either do not exist or exist so
rarely that they are unlikely to have significant effects on behavior. Most
philosophical traditions assume that virtues are global traits-that if a person
is honest, for example, he will be honest in business dealings, when under
oath in court, in taking tests, and so on. The non-existence or paucity of such
traits, situationists contend, should force us to abandon virtue ethics. Empirical studies show that situations have far more effect on behavior.
Slingerland criticizes situation ism on a variety of grounds. First, he adduces psychological studies to sh ow that the person-situation debate in
psychology is passe. Second, he criticizes the situationists' reading of the
0.3 personality coefficient for correlation s of traits with behavior across
situations, contending that it is more s ignificant than situationists typically allow. FinaBy, he criticizes the conceptual distinction between local
and global traits, arguing that the re is no analytic dichotomy between such
t raits, but instead, a spectrum. What counts as local and global t raits is
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often determined pragmatically. Despite these drawbacks, situationism
has a point that needs to be addressed: classical virtue traditions assume
that virtuous behavior must approach 1.0. Virtuous people are not allowed
to steal or cheat only once or a few times; they must strive to be virtuous at
all times . Early Confucian virtue ethics, Slingerland argues, offers a program for h ow this might be achieved. Rigorous training in virtue, or extension, helps learners to develop their positive traits and curb their negative
tendencies. This helps learners to clear the situationist s' "bar." Yet the bar
is lowered by the ongoing presence of situational factors, such as ritual
practice, the study of ancient texts, the presence of a teacher, and other
environmental stimuli that chronically prime learners to think, feel, and
act virtuously. The combination of a lowered bar and intensive education
helps Confucian learners t o "jump" the situationist hurdle. Or so we can
hope-a hope that is reinforced, Slingerland notes, by recent psychological
work on roles for nooconscious processing in the acquisition of virtue.
Owen Flanagan takes readers into the complexities of Buddhism in "It
Takes a Metaphysics: Raising Virtuous Buddhists." Flanagan offers a rational
reconstruction of Buddhist moral education by advanCing the view that
Buddhism requires learners to know more than the ethical truths espoused
by their tradition: it requires them to absorb key metaphysical truths that
ground a calling or commitment. Buddhist s must feel and embrace this
calling to be able to live their lives in accordance with Buddhism's distinctive, and very demanding, set of values. Flanagan's aim is to answer a central question: How do Buddhists get from the "is" of metaphysical and natural facts to the "ought" of living a certain kind of ethical life?
Though Buddhism has many sects and invokes many concepts, the
common core that Flanagan identifies consists of the Four Noble Truths
the Noble Eightfold Path, and the Four Immeasurables. These doctrines
contain diagn oses of the human condition, such as the notion that all sentient beings suffer, as well as ethical prescriptions and prohibitions for relieving this suffering. At one level, what seems required of the Buddhist
practitioner is that some actions be taken and others avoided-a kind of
continence. But at a deeper level, more challenging self-cultivation is required . At this level, the Buddhist is trying t o develop difficult dispositions
that should be universal in applicability, such as the Four Immeasurablescompassion, loving-kindness, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. These are
the virtues possessed by the saint or sage who is on the verge of enlightenment. Why struggle to attain these, and other demanding Buddhist virtues? To answer this, a rather complex story needs to be told.
Naturalistic as well as non-naturalistic versions of Buddhism and of the
motivation s for Buddhist virtue cultivation are available. Flanagan opts for
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a naturalistic understanding. His story recognizes the deeply integrated
Buddhist woridview, according to which metaphysical doctrines, such as
impermanence, dependent origination, and "no-self" are the background
conditions within which Buddhist ethical strictures are to be understood
and taught. We suffer because we seek permanence in an imperm"anent
world and because our egos separate ourselves from others with whom we
are dependently related. There are no unique essences, including persons.
Though we perceive individuated entities, they are in reality aspects of
being that is in a continual state of unfolding. We must come to understand
these and other truths through instruction in philosophy, and to grasp
some of them in non-conceptual ways through mindfulness practices, such
as forms of meditation. Yet none of these ideas, Flanagan argues, is sufficient to ground the "ought" of Buddhist ethics. We could accept Buddhism's
metaphysical doctrines and become nihilists. The crucial moment in the
psychology of moral development is when the Buddhist learner experiences an overpowering desire or "calling" which, due to prior philosophical
reflection, she has no reason to refuse. To embrace this calling is to enter
fully the stream of Buddhist life.
In "Islam and the Cultivation of Character: Ibn Miskawayh's Synthesis
and the Case of the Veil," Elizabeth Bucar uses the writings of the tenthcentury Islamic thinker Ibn Miskawayh to elucidate an Islamic view of
virtue and apply it to the practice of veiling. In the first part of her chapter,
she introduces the thought of Ibn Miskawayh, and in the second, she analyzes the practice of veiling and the virtue of modesty in terms of the
framework his work provides. She concludes with some observations about
the virtue'of modesty in contemporary contexts.
Sacred texts, Bucar explains, are not the only sources of Islamic ethics.
Ethics in the Islamic tradition has been articulated through various "special
sciences." Among these, Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh, has been perceived
to hold pride of place in matters of morals rules and codes. The cultivation
of virtue and character is the province of another special science, namely
adab, or Islamic etiquette. Adab tells practitioners of Islam how to acquire
manners, morals, and character. Ibn Miskawayh's writings contribute to
this area; indeed, he is regarded as the father of Islamic virtue ethics, as his
writings attempt to syntheSize revealed truths of Islam and the inSights of
ancient Greek philosophy. Ibn Miskawayh adopts Plato's view of the soul
as a self-subsisting entity, and Aristotle's conception of virtue as an entrenched, habituated disposition that goes "all the way down"-that is, as
deeply embedded in the personality of the agent. Vet he views human nature
as religious; we are creatures of God and follow a divine plan. Character formation is a process of perfecting the soul for God. Three aspects of Ibn
Miskawayh's view are crucial: the centrality of bodily practices, the habitu-
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ation of sexual appetites, and the social dimensions of virtue. Through bodily
practices we are able to grow in virtue. Frequently, the action precedes the
virtuous intention or disposition. We act as if we are virtuous first, then

eventually come to be virtuous. Sexual appetites, though not intrinsically
evil, need to be regulated and properly ordered in a virtuous life. Finally,
virtue is a public or social matter. We become virtuous with and through
the influence of others, and we strive to achieve societies that exemplify
forms of corporate virtue.

With this framework in hand, Bucar explains the practice of veiling and
its centrality to the virtue of modesty by addressing the questions: What
does veiling ethically do? and, What role does veiling play in character formation? Her aim is to reveal veiling as something more than a symbol of
religiOUS fundamentalism: it is a practice that helps Muslims to acquire
virtue. Though Qur'anic texts on veiling raise interpretative difficulties,

they have implications for the modesty of both men and women. Men are
instr'ucted to avert their gazes; women, to cover various body parts. The
idea is that women must cover themselves in certain ways in order to affect

how men look at them. Women are admonished to dress and act, and men,
to act in ways designed to avoid inflaming illicit sexual desires. Veiling
takes place in public. It is an ethical practice that creates a "public virtue
zone," in which Muslim men and women are reminded of the need for, and
encouraged to strive toward, sexual modesty.
In her concluding observations, Bucar points out two interesting dimensions of veiling. First, veiling is a gendered practice. Might it be true that the

Islamic virtue of modesty is also gendered? Second, what counts as modesty
in dress and comportment varies in different Muslim countries in the

twenty-first century. Does this entail relativism-that modesty itself, and
perhaps other Islamic virtues, vary according to time and place? Perhaps
not, as Bucar identifies three common features of Islamic modesty: its focus
on women; its insistence on personal dispositions, and not merely outward

dress and behavior; and its contribution to a visual culture of Islam: shared
images and perceptions co-construct personal religious identity and virtue.

Jennifer A. Herdt explores the history of character cultivation in the
Christian tradition in "Frailty, Fragmentation, and Social Dependency in
the Cultivation of Christian Virtue." Herdt stresses that Christianity is a
living tradition of character formation; Christians have been interested not
only in a correct understanding of reality but also in moral ways of livingways that bring believers d oser to God through the emulation of Christ.
Christ is the exemplar for those who want freedom from sin and death, and
he provides the power to emulate him for those seelting to do so. How Christ
is best emulated is a complex story with many levels of interpretation, but
at the heart of it, Herdt contends, is the need for character formation.
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Though some early Christians emulated Christ through the idealization
of martyrdom and ascetic practice, others believed that another path was
open to people in all walks of life. They found sustenance in the writings of
the Didache, an early list of precepts whose central commandment was to
love-love God, one's neighbors, one's enemies, and oneself. The commandment to love. Herdt maintains, was at bottom an injunction to character formation. Christians should become people with certain kinds of characters,
intentions, and motives . Practices relating to self-control and meditation,
which can be conceptualized as forms of spiritual exercises, were stressed. By
the fourth century, two common factors had emerged: the centrality of love
and humility. Humility is crucial to the story of Christian character, for it
highlights human dependency on God's grace, frailty in the face of temptation and sin, and egalitarianism-we are all weak and sinful before God.
Practices of self-examination and of repentance and individual and communal healing went along with the stress on humility.
Christian theologians and philosophers transformed many debates
about the virtues from ancient Greek and Roman thinkers. The medieval
scholastics, especially Aquinas, brought thinking about virtue to new levels
of systematicity. Aquinas saw that the final end of humankind, fellowship
with God, could not be attained without divine grace. Faith, hope, and charity
were three theological virtues that are infused in us through the sacraments to help us achieve that end, but so, too, were many other moral virtues supplemented by divine power in order properly to orient us beyond
the end of human happiness. The Reformation theologian Martin Luther
repudiated virtue, with its resonances in pagan philosophy. He emphasized
grace and not works. Communities that embraced Luther's thought formed
Christian character through practices such as prayer, corporate worship,
preaching, fasting, and meditation. In the twentieth century, philosophers
as well as Catholic and Protestant theologians have again become interested in virtue. Many of the characteristics of virtue in the Christian tradition. Herdt argues, could indemnify it against recent situationist attacks
on Aristotelian virtue. For example, recognizing the fragility of virtue and
the need for God's grace to sustain it, as well as the injunction to see others
as neighbors, are aspects of Christian virtue that offer a more realistic picture of humanity's prospects than Aristotelianism.
Darcia Narvaez takes an evolutionary view of the conditions needed for
the development of virtue in "The Co-Construction of Virtue: Epigenetics,
Development, and Culture." She identifies the care conditions necessary
for the healthy growth of the physiological and brain capacities required for
virtue, and calls this environment, the "evolved developmental niche" (EDN).
Depending on the early care a child receives, he or she can come to have

IN TRO DU CT I ON

(13)

different ethical orientations, each with multiple subtypes: the Safety
ethic, the Engagement ethic, or the Imagination ethic. Narvaez contends
that the conditions for developing the optimal ethical orientation, the Imagination ethic, are found in hunter-gatherer societies, and offers suggestions for how the wisdom of hunter-gatherers can be reclaimed for virtue
cultivation in our own day and age.
Proper brain and body functioning, Narvaez contends, are required for
the development of capacities, such as perception, attention, emotional
self-regulation, empathy, and social skills, all of which are needed for virtue.
Scientific studies support the view that forms of early caregiving, such as
frequent touch, breastfeeding, play, nurturing social support, and even
natural childbirth, are vital for the development of these capacities. These
forms of care mark the optimal environment of early nurturance, the EDN.
Though care received under these conditions can set children on the path to
virtue, there are ways in which care can go awry. Narvaez explores these by
refeience to the triune ethics theory. According to this theory, the Safety
ethic is the most primitive moral response, focusing on "me and mine." It
develops through undercare in early childhood. More promising is the Engagement ethic, which gives rise to prosocial, compassionate response, is
fostered in the EDN, and is primed by caring, supportive relationships. The
most highly evolved ethic is the Imagination ethic, which uses abstraction,
deliberation, and imagination to expand capacities for empathic engagement beyond face-to-face interaction.
Hunter-gatherer societies, Narvaez argues, support the EDN for children
and others throughout life. AllOwing for autonomy yet emphasizing community, such societies stress sodal interconnections as well as unity with nature.
Contemporary Western societies do not emphasize these interconnections,
and, indeed, create conditions that undermine them. In Narvaez's view, these
conditions constitute cultures of competitive detachment within which the
EDN is not supported. The recovery of hunter-gatherer values and mindsets,
she contends, can be achieved by emphasizing cultures of cooperative companionship, which rekindle the need for and value of ''being with" others and
the world in interdependent relationships, as well as autopoeisis, or the
active partiCipation of the self in its own development and organization.
Companionship virtue and autopoesis in virtue development are ways in
which mindful morality and communal imagination can take hold.
Moral development in early childhood is Ross A. Thompson's topic in 'The
Development of Virtue: A Perspective from Developmental Psychology."
Thompson reviews a number of psychological studies of children under the
age of five years that counter common misconceptions of toddlers as either
egoists or as budding altruists. Studies of early childhood provide evidence
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of the emergence of a premoral sensibility that could serve as the foundation for further character development.
Studies show that twelve- to eighteen-month-old toddlers interpret the actions of people they watch in terms of inferred goals and intentions. This
seems to be evidence of early social understanding, which, researchers believe, is nonegocentric in the sense that young children do not confuse their own
intentions and goals with those of the adults they observe. These achievements
provide the basis for a range of skills and capacities which, taken together, shape
the contours of a premoral sensibility. For example, studies indicate that toddlers are capable of shared intentionality-that is, the ability to have psychological states similar to those of others, including shared goals and intentions. Shared intentionality is essential for cooperative, prosocial behavior.
Studies suggest that young children engage in such behavior as result of
spontaneously understanding, sharing, and knowing how to assist in the
achievement of others' goals, and not &om the desire to obtain extrinsic rewards. Experiments also reveal that toddlers are able to appraise others' behavior in terms of its effects on goal attainment, punish those who obstruct
the efforts of others to reach goals, reward those who help, and provide benefits to those who are victimized. Emotion understanding is another aspect of
a premoral sensibility that young children display. Young children show skills in
interpreting others' emotions, including capadties for empathy. In agreement
with Slote's general line of argument, Thompson contends that these abilities are
important for moral development, as parents often enlist emotional responses
in attempts to teach children about values and how to behave morally.
Young children's' premoral sensibility is an important precursor for further moral development. The foundations of conscience, for example, seem
to be established in early childhood-evidence for this is found in studies of
children as young as age two and a half. "Conscience" is understood by developmental psychologists to refer to the processes by which children construct and act consistently with internal generalizable standards of conduct.
EchOing themes from Narvaez, studies show that the quality of parent-child
relationships is crucial to the growth of conscience and individual differences in moral conduct. Finally, Thompson discusses research on moral
identity, or the construction of a sense of self around moral values. Significantly, a longitudinal study found correlations of conscience development
in children from ages two to four and a half with the emergence of a "moral
self" at age five and a half, and socially and emotionally competent behavior
at age six and a half. Despite evidence for a developmental trajectory from a
premoral sensibility through the growth of conscience and the formation of
moral identity, Thompson notes that many questions remain unanswered.
In "Psychological Science and the Nicomachean Ethics: Virtuous Actors,
Agents, and Authors," Dan P. McAdams draws on empirical work from a
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variety of fields to advance a three-stage perspective of the development of
virtue, ranging from infancy through adulthood. He argues that this tripartite developmental scheme is broadly con sistent with the account of virtue
given by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. According to this scheme, different layers of the self contribute to full virtue: the self as a social actor, as
a motivated agent, and as an autobiographical author. Each layer represents a form of growth or maturation into virtue.

After briefly remarking on the death of situationism in psychology and
recent trends in the empirical study of virtue, McAdams turns to an account

of the earliest stage of virtue development, that of the social actor. This
stage, he believes, resonates with Aristotle's views of how families and the
state must provide the social supports and guidance needed to habituate and
educate children into virtuous behavior. Temperament and sociality are key
influences here. As social beings, we are taught to be virtuous. Social action

that ostensibly accords with virtue precedes action produced by the motivation or desire to act virtuously. A child might share her toys, for example,
only because her parents tell her to and not because she genuinely desires to
be fair or generous. Moreover, temperament makes a difference to the per-

sonality traits children come to have as well as to how they develop in virtue.
Positive emotionality can give rise to extraversion, prosocial behavior, and
hope. whereas negative emotionality can lead to neuroticism . Being low in

neuroticism correlates with virtues such as humility and serenity. Effortful
control can lead through experiences of empathy and guilt to agreeableness
and conscientiousness. These traits provide resources for the development

of several virtues, including prudence, order, and resolution.
Consistently with studies mentioned by Thompson, ages five through
seven mark notable advances in the child's development. Several developmental psychologists note that during this period, the child becomes capable
of rational choice and deliberation. She acquires personal goals and begins to
exercise her own agency in pursuit of them. She comes to see herself as a

motivated agent. Her agency does not supplant her traits, but is layered in
with them. At this second stage, the child displays genuine virtue. The third
stage McAdams discusses is that of the autobiographical author. Here he invokes Aristotle's views on wisdom and contemplation. This is the pinnacle of
virtue, available only to the mature, perhaps older, adult. The autobiographical author takes a retrospective view of her life; she is able to look back over
the years and form a narrative that gives her life meaning. McAdams and
others have found evidence that the lives of moral exemplars who excel in
specific virtues, such as caring or courage, are sometimes characterized by

redemption sequences-accounts of emerging from hardship or other negative experiences strengthened, or with insight, or transformed. Such individuals, whose narratives are often influenced by their cultures, display high

(16 )

Introduction

levels of gen erativity through activities, such as teaching, mentoring, and
other forms of prasoda! involvement, aimed at leaving a positive legacy.
I have given the psychologists the last word in this volume fo r two reasons. One is that their work reinforces, from a scientific perspective. views
articulated earlier in the collection by philosophers and theologians. The
other is that their contributions necessarily remain open-ended. As Thompson points out, there is much about virtue development th at we do not
know. So we end, then, not only by presenting new perspectives on virtue
cultivation but also with an invitation to readers to press ahead with their
own ideas on this subject. The positive legacy of this volume, I hope, will be
to move research on virtue cultivation forward.

NOTES
1. See Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);
Michael Slate, Moral Sentimen talism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010),
and Morals From Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Christ.ine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and
Daniel C. Russell , Practicallnteihgence and the Virtues (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009).
2. For Kantianism, see, for example, Anne Margaret Baxley, Kant's Theory of Virtue: The
Value of Autocracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For utilitarianism,
see Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
3. Notable exceptions include Julia Annas, Intelligen t Virtu e (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); David Carr and Jan Steutel, eds., Virtue Ethics and Moral Education
(New York: Rou tledge, 1999); and Brad K. Wilburn, ed ., Moral Cultivation : Essays on
the Devel'!pment of Character and Virtue (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
4. Slingerland's essay is a reworked version of the article that originally appeared in
Ethics.
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